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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model of hospital competition where (i) waiting times increase if
demand exceeds supply; (ii) patients choose a hospital based in part on waiting times; and (iii)
hospitals incur waiting time penalties. We show that, whereas policies based on penalties will
lead to lower waiting times, policies that promote patient choice will instead lead to higher
waiting times. These results are robust to different game-theoretic solution concepts, designs
of the hospital penalty structure, and patient utility specifications. Furthermore, waiting time
penalties are likely to be more effective in reducing waiting times if they are designed with a
linear penalty structure, but the counterproductive effect of patient choice policies is smaller
when penalties are convex. These conclusions are partly derived by calibration of our model
based on waiting times and elasticities observed in the English NHS for a common treatment
(cataract surgery).
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1 Introduction
Waiting times for non-emergency (elective) treatments are a key health policy concern across OECD
countries, such as Australia, Canada, Ireland, Finland, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.
Mean waiting times range between 50 and 150 days across countries for common procedures such
as cataract surgery, hip and knee replacement, hernia, hysterectomy, and prostatectomy (Siciliani
et al., 2014). Although some countries like Finland and the UK have had successes in 2000-2005
in reducing waiting times from high levels (e.g., more than 150 days on average for hip and knee
replacement), waiting times have stalled in most countries since the financial crisis and have slowly
started to rise again in some countries. In countries like Chile, Poland, and Estonia, waiting times
for hip and knee procedures are still above one year (OECD, 2017).
Waiting times are a major source of dissatisfaction for patients since they postpone health ben-
efits, may worsen symptoms, deteriorate patients’ conditions, and lead to worse clinical outcomes.
In response to the dissatisfaction that they generate, governments have taken a variety of measures
to reduce waiting times. Many OECD countries have adopted some form of maximum waiting
time guarantees (Siciliani, Moran, and Borowitz, 2013). However, the design and implementation
of these guarantees can differ significantly across countries.
Two common approaches are to link maximum wait guarantees either to penalties or to compe-
tition (and patient choice) policies. The first approach was followed by Finland and England, which
combined maximum waiting times with sanctions for failure to fulfil the guarantee. Targets with
penalties were introduced in England in 2000-05 with political oversight from the Prime Ministerial
Delivery Unit and the Health Care Commission. Senior health administrators risked losing their
jobs if targets were not met. As a result, the proportion of patients waiting over six months was
reduced by 6-9 percentage points (Propper, Sutton, et al., 2008). In 2010, maximum wait guaran-
tees became a patient entitlement codified into the NHS Constitution, establishing a patient right
to a maximum of 18 weeks from GP referral to treatment. In Finland, waiting time guarantees
were combined with targets as part of the Health Care Guarantee in 2005, subsequently included in
the 2010 Health Care Act. A National Supervisory Agency supervised the implementation of the
guarantee through targets and penalised municipalities failing to comply. The number of patients
waiting over six months was reduced from 12.6 per 1, 000 population in 2002 to 6.6 per 1, 000 in
2005 (Siciliani, Moran, and Borowitz, 2013).
The second approach involves combining maximum waiting time guarantees with patient choice
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and competition policies. For example, in Denmark, if the hospital foresees that the maximum
waiting time guarantee will not be fulfilled, the patient can choose another public or private hospital.
In Portugal, when a patient on the waiting list reaches 75% of the maximum guaranteed time, a
voucher that allows the patient to seek treatment at any other provider, including private sector
providers, is issued. In several countries, like England and Norway, patients are free to choose any
provider within the country (Siciliani et al., 2017).
From an economics perspective, waiting times act as a non-price rationing device to bring into
equilibrium the demand for and the supply of health care in publicly-funded health systems. Many
countries with a National Health Service or public health insurance combine the absence of co-
payments with the presence of capacity constraints. As a result, an excess demand arises, which
translates into a waiting list. One way to bring the demand for and the supply of treatments into
equilibrium is to rely on waiting times. As argued by Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), Martin
and Smith (1999), and Iversen (1993, 1997), waiting times tend to discourage demand if patients
give up the treatment or opt for treatment in the private sector. Waiting times may also influence
positively the supply of health services if altruistic providers exert greater effort and treat more
patients when waiting times are higher.
In the present study, we investigate whether competition and patient choice policies play a
useful role in reducing waiting times, and the extent to which such a role is altered in the presence
of penalties for providers with long waits. Our model is dynamic to capture a key feature of the
waiting time phenomenon. Waiting times tend to increase when demand for treatment is higher
than the supply of treatment so that new patients are added to the waiting list. Similarly, waiting
times tend to reduce when more patients are removed from the waiting list than those added. A
second feature of our model is that hospitals compete for patients, with hospitals with lower waiting
times attracting more patients.
The combination of a dynamic approach with strategic interactions across providers calls for
a differential-game approach. Although we solve the model for both open-loop and closed-loop
decision rules (Dockner, 2000), our main analysis is based on the arguably more realistic feedback
(closed-loop) solution, where hospitals can observe (and react to) waiting times at each point
in time, implying that supply decisions can be continuously revised based on the evolution of
waiting times. Under open-loop decision rules, hospitals compute their optimal supply paths at the
beginning of the game and are restricted to follow such plans thereafter. It seems plausible that
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hospitals can adjust supply over time in response to the dynamics of waiting times (own and those
of rival hospitals).
To model the demand for healthcare faced by each provider, we use a Hotelling approach with
two hospitals located at each endpoint of the unit line segment. We adopt a general specification,
which allows for two types of patients who differ in the valuation of their outside option (e.g.,
to seek treatment in the private sector or to forego treatment altogether), which in turn implies
different net benefits, high and low, from hospital treatment. Hospitals compete on the segment
of demand with high benefit, while they are local monopolists on the demand segment with low
benefit.
Our main aim is to investigate the effect of policies that facilitate patient choice, commonly
interpreted as policies that stimulate competition, and how such policies interact with policies based
on waiting time penalties. Within our analytical framework, patient choice policies are modelled as
a reduction in patients’ transportation costs, which makes each hospital’s demand more responsive
to changes in waiting times and is a standard competition measure in spatial competition models.
The effect of such policies is studied in contexts where waiting time penalties are either linear in
waiting times or convex in waiting times, with the marginal penalty increasing with waiting.
We obtain several policy relevant findings. Importantly, we find that policies to increase patient
choice lead to higher steady-state waiting times as long as hospitals suffer a disutility from positive
waiting times. Increased patient choice makes demand more responsive to changes in waiting
times, which implies that a unilateral reduction in waiting time at one hospital will lead to a larger
demand increase for this hospital. This implies, in turn, that it becomes more difficult for each
hospital to reduce waiting times through a unilateral increase in the supply of treatments. In
other words, patient choice policies reduce the effectiveness of treatment supply as an instrument
to reduce waiting times. The policy implication of this result is that patient choice policies are
counterproductive, in terms of reducing waiting times, in the presence of waiting time penalties.
Moreover, higher waiting penalties make patient choice policies even more counterproductive. We
also show that a combined policy of more patient choice and higher waiting time penalties will lead
to higher waiting times if the waiting time penalty is sufficiently high to begin with.
The above described results are derived analytically for the case of constant marginal provider
disutility of waiting time, for example because of linear waiting time penalties. For the case of
convex waiting time penalties, a closed-form solution cannot be obtained, and our results are
4
therefore numerically derived. To make the results more salient, we calibrate our model based
on waiting times observed in the English NHS for a common treatment (cataract surgery). The
calibration is also informed by demand elasticities which have been estimated in the empirical
literature (Martin and Smith, 1999; Sivey, 2012).
The calibration output shows that our main result, that patient choice policies lead to higher
waiting times, also carries over to the case of convex waiting time penalties. This comes as no
surprise, the intuition behind this result does not rely on the shape of the provider disutility
function but rather on the responsiveness of demand to waiting times. Not only is this result
robust to the design of the waiting time penalty structure, it holds under a fairly general patient
utility specification and is independent of the choice of game-theoretic solution concept, as it arises
also under open-loop decision rules.
However, under closed-loop rules (where hospitals can observe and react to waiting times at
each point in time), convex waiting time penalties introduce an additional strategic effect by cre-
ating dynamic strategic substitutability in supply. This implies that lower treatment supply by
one hospital will be optimally met by increased supply by the competing hospital, which dampens
the initial increase in waiting time caused by the supply reduction. This strategic substitutability
gives each hospital an incentive to reduce its supply in order to ‘free-ride’ on the subsequent supply
increase by the other hospital. The policy implication of this result is that, all else equal, waiting
time penalties are likely to be more effective in reducing waiting times if they are designed with
a linear penalty structure. On the other hand, we also show that the counterproductive effect of
patient choice policies is smaller when penalties are convex instead of linear, which gives rise to yet
another inherent conflict between these two policies. Waiting time penalties are more effective if
they are linear, but linear penalties make patient choice policies more counterproductive.
The rest of the study is organised as follows. In the next section, we present a brief overview
of the literature and explain how we contribute to it. In Section 3, we present the model, whereas
the main analysis, based on the closed-loop solution, is given in Section 4. Section 5 considers
patient welfare. Section 6 examines the robustness of our main result to non-linear patient utility
in waiting time and distance. Finally, Section 7 provides concluding remarks, including a discussion
of how our main results relate to the empirical literature on patient choice and waiting times.
5
2 Related literature
Our study brings together two different strands of the theoretical literature. The first is the
literature that investigates the role of waiting times in the health sector. As mentioned above,
the idea that waiting times may help bringing the supply and the demand for healthcare into
equilibrium goes back to Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) and Iversen (1993). Iversen (1997) also
investigates whether allowing patients to be treated in the private sector will reduce waiting times in
the public sector and shows that the answer depends on the demand elasticity for public treatment
with respect to waiting time. Demand and supply responsiveness to waiting times are estimated
by Martin and Smith (1999) using English data, and they find that demand is generally inelastic
(with an elasticity of about −0.1).
There are also normative analyses in this strand of the literature. Hoel and Sæther (2003)
show that concerns for equity can make it optimal to have a mixed system of public and private
provision with a positive waiting time in the public sector, though Marchand and Schroyen (2005)
find, through a calibration exercise, that the welfare gains of a mixed system might be quite
low. Gravelle and Siciliani (2008a, 2008c) investigate the scope for waiting time prioritisation
policies across and within treatments and find that prioritisation is generally welfare improving
even in a setting where the provider can only observe some dimensions of patient benefit. Gravelle
and Siciliani (2008b) also show that rationing by copay tends to be welfare improving relative to
rationing by waiting. All the above studies use a static approach assuming that demand and supply
adjust instantaneously to reach equilibrium. One exception is Siciliani (2006), who investigates the
behaviour of a monopolist in a dynamic set-up. We model waiting time dynamics in a similar
way but critically allow for strategic interactions across providers to investigate the role of patient
choice and competition.
The second strand of the literature relates to hospital competition with fixed prices. Though
most of this literature consists of studies using a static framework, there is a limited but growing
literature that models hospital competition in a dynamic framework. It focuses, however, on
incentives for quality provision rather than on waiting times.1 Brekke et al. (2010, 2012) find that,
if quality is modelled as a stock variable which increases if quality investments are higher than its
depreciation, or if demand is sluggish so that an increase in quality only partially translates into an
increase in demand, then quality is higher under the open-loop solution if hospitals face increasing
1See Brekke et al. (2014) for a review of the theoretical literature on hospital competition under regulated prices.
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marginal treatment costs. Equilibrium quality instead coincide under the two solution concepts if
marginal treatment costs are constant. Siciliani, Straume, and Cellini (2013) suggest that these
results can be overturned in the presence of altruistic preferences, so that quality is higher under
the closed-loop solution.
Our modelling of waiting times differs analytically from these previous contributions because
the state variable (i.e., waiting time) of the rival enters the dynamic constraint of the maximisation
problem of each provider. This is not the case when quality is modelled as a stock (as in Brekke et
al., 2010) because neither the state nor control variable of the rival provider enters the quality stock
function. It is also not the case when demand is modelled as sluggish (as in Brekke et al., 2012)
because demand depends on the control variable of the rival, not the state variable. Thus, because
of these fundamental differences in the dynamic nature of the problems, the results from models
of dynamic quality competition do not automatically carry over to the case of waiting times. In
other words, if we want to study the effects of patient choice and competition on waiting times in
a dynamic context, we cannot simply interpret waiting time as ‘negative quality’ and apply the
results from the above mentioned studies of dynamic quality competition.
As previously mentioned, in the main bulk of the theoretical literature on hospital competition,
the theoretical framework is a static one. To our knowledge, Brekke et al. (2008) were the first
to deal with waiting times. Similarly to the present study, they identify a potentially positive
relationship between patient choice and equilibrium waiting times. However, the underlying mech-
anisms are very different. In the static model (Brekke et al., 2008), hospitals choose waiting times
to influence demand and in turn revenues. Increased competition (patient choice) makes demand
more responsive to changes in waiting time, which then becomes a more effective tool for each
hospital to steer demand in the desired direction. If hospitals are semi-altruistic, the equilibrium
is such that price is below marginal cost (for the marginal treatment). Hospitals might therefore
have an incentive to reduce demand, and waiting times become a more powerful tool to achieve this
when patient choice increases, paving the way for a positive relationship between patient choice
and equilibrium waiting times.
In the present dynamic approach, more competition also makes demand more responsive to
waiting times, but then the similarities end. Hospitals choose treatment supply but cannot directly
control waiting times. The supply decision is instead used as an instrument to affect waiting
times, and this instrument becomes less effective with increased patient choice. This is why more
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competition leads to higher waiting times in our dynamic setting, and the underlying mechanism is
not related to price being below marginal cost in equilibrium, although this feature is also present
here. Thus, the present study is not just a dynamic version of Brekke et al. (2008), in the sense
that the results rely on the same mechanisms placed in a dynamic context. Rather, placing the
analysis in a dynamic framework allows us to uncover new mechanisms that are uniquely related
to the dynamic process that generates changes in waiting times. In this sense, the present dynamic
analysis complements and reinforces the previous results based on a static framework.
More recently, Chen et al. (2016) developed a two-period signalling model in which they analyse
the effect of waiting time report cards (i.e., the public reporting of waiting times) on the supply
decisions and waiting times of two hospitals. Waiting times report cards increase competition
in the market by providing patients with information and, hence, making demand responsive to
waiting times. This generally gives hospitals incentives to increase their service rates (supply) up
to the point where the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost, causing waiting times to fall in
equilibrium. However, if the exogenous hospital qualities differ and are unknown to some patients,
an incentive to use long waiting times as a signal for treatment quality arises for the high-quality
hospital. Chen et al. (2016) show that the competitive effect (to attract patients) induced by
waiting time report cards outweighs the signalling effect, so that both hospitals’ waiting times are
shorter than when there are no report cards, thus establishing a negative link between increased
competition and waiting times (regardless of whether hospital qualities differ or are identical, which
is the case that is equivalent to our analysis).
Their model shares with ours the feature that hospitals may only affect waiting times indirectly
through supply but, crucially, assumes that hospitals face no form of disutility of waiting time.
In the present analysis, increased supply is used not only to increase revenues but also to reduce
waiting times and, hence, the disutility thereof. Increased supply reduces waiting times, which,
in turn, attracts patients and thus dampens the initial decrease in waiting times. This demand
response is stronger the greater is the degree of patient choice in the market. Higher demand
responsiveness weakens the incentive hospitals have to increase supply and this is why the negative
relationship between increased competition (patient choice) and waiting times fails to arise in the
presence of hospital disutility of waiting time.
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3 The Model
Consider a duopolistic health care market in which hospitals, indexed by i and j, are located at
each endpoint of the unit line segment [0, 1]. There are N potential patients uniformly distributed
on the line segment. In every period t, each of these patients may benefit from treatment at
either of the two hospitals. In order to consume one unit of treatment, patients bear no out-of-
pocket expenditures at the hospital but face expenses (or disutility) in the form of travelling costs.
Furthermore, patients are required to join a waiting list and therefore suffer a disutility of waiting.
There are two types of patients, differing with respect to the value of their outside option (i.e.,
the utility of not being treated by either of the two hospitals). Whereas a share β of the patients
are assumed to have no valuable outside option, the remaining share (1−β) have a strictly positive
outside option k > 0. For simplicity, we assume that these shares are constant along the line
segment. The difference between these two patient types can be attributed either to a difference
in illness severity, which creates a difference in the utility of being untreated, or to a difference in
the ability to seek treatment elsewhere (e.g., in a private market or abroad), for example, due to
differences in income or wealth.
Both types of patients make utility-maximising treatment consumption decisions, taking into
account travelling costs as well as the length of time between the moment they join the waiting list
and that when treatment is supplied (i.e., the waiting time). The utility in period t of a patient
with no valuable outside option, who is located at x ∈ [0, 1] and chooses Hospital i, located at zi,
is given by
u(x, zi, t) = v − wi(t)− τ |x− zi|, (1)
where v is the gross valuation of treatment, wi(t) is the waiting time at Hospital i in period t, and
τ is the marginal disutility of travelling. The marginal disutility of waiting is normalised to one,
which allows τ to be interpreted as the marginal disutility of travelling relative to waiting. The
equivalent utility in period t of a patient with a strictly positive outside option is
u(x, zi, t) = v − k − wi(t)− τ |x− zi|. (2)
For patients with a positive outside option, we assume that k is sufficiently high such that some
of these patients will strictly prefer the outside option to being treated by any of the two hospitals
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in the market. This implies that the relevant choice for each of these patients is between seeking
treatment at the most preferred hospital or exercising the outside option. We will refer to this as
the monopolistic segment of the market. For all the patients without a valuable outside option,
we assume that utility is maximised by seeking treatment at one of the hospitals. These patients
therefore constitute the competitive segment of the market. By concentrating on cases where the
competitive segment is fully covered, whereas the monopolistic segment is only partially covered,
we ensure that total demand is elastic with respect to waiting times, implying that waiting times
have a rationing effect on demand.
3.1 Demand for hospital treatment
In the competitive segment, the patient who is indifferent between seeking treatment at Hospital i
and Hospital j is located at xC(t), implicitly given by









In the monopolistic segment, the patient who is indifferent between demanding treatment at Hos-
pital i and consuming his or her outside option is located at xiM (t), implicitly given by
v − wi(t)− τxiM = k, (5)
yielding
xiM (t) =
v − k − wi(t)
τ
. (6)
A similar expression can be obtained for Hospital j: xjM (t) = (v − k − wj(t))/τ .
With a total mass N of patients in the market, demand faced by Hospitals i and j is a weighted
sum of demand from the competitive and the monopolistic segments and is respectively given by
Di(wi(t), wj(t)) = N [βxC(t) + (1− β)xiM (t)] (7)
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and
Dj(wi(t), wj(t)) = N [β(1− xC(t)) + (1− β)xjM (t)]. (8)
3.2 Hospital objectives and treatment supply
In each period t, Hospital i treats Si(t) patients. Hospitals are financed by a third-payer (e.g., a
regulator or insurer) that offers a prospective payment p for each unit of treatment supplied and a
lump-sum transfer T . The instantaneous objective function of Hospital i is assumed to be
Πi(t) = T + pSi(t)− C(Si(t))− Φ(wi(t)). (9)




2, with γ > 0. The convexity of the cost function captures an important feature
in the context of waiting times, namely that hospitals face capacity constraints.2 The function
Φ(wi(t)) captures the provider disutility of having positive waiting times. The disutility of waiting
time is monetary if the hospital faces penalties levied by the regulator or reductions in funding.
Alternatively, it is non-monetary if the hospital takes into the account the reputational damage of
reporting long waiting times, or if the hospital is subject to a more stringent monitoring regime by
the regulator. We assume that the disutility of waiting time takes the linear-quadratic form





with α1 ≥ 0 and α2 ≥ 0. Whether waiting times penalties have a linear or non-linear effect on
hospital utility depends on the institutional context. In settings where hospital managers can
lose their jobs when waiting times become very long, penalties are arguably non-linear, with the
marginal penalty increasing with waiting. This may also be the case in health systems where health
regulators have mechanisms that escalate from warning messages to agreeing and monitoring action
plans with the providers. Other health systems may instead gradually penalise hospitals with longer
wait through a proportionate reduction in revenues.
Hospital targets are set for broad areas of care, typically all elective (non-emergency) care. Only
in recent years some more stringent maximum waiting times have been specified for prioritised areas
2A strictly convex treatment cost function captures the case of smooth capacity constraints, where capacity can
be increased, but only at an increasing marginal cost.
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of care, such as cancer patients or certain cardiac surgeries (Siciliani, Moran, and Borowitz, 2013).
Although our model is specified for a specific treatment which is reimbursed with DRG price p,
any increase in supply for a specific treatment will contribute to reduce waiting times and help
to satisfy the targets across all elective care. In Section 4.3, we calibrate the model for a specific
treatment, cataract surgery. We choose this procedure because it has high volume and is correlated
with waiting times for other high-volume procedures (such as hip and knee replacement; Siciliani
et el., 2014). It has also similar demand elasticity to waiting across all elective care (Martin and
Smith, 1999; Sivey, 2012).
Waiting times evolve dynamically over time according to
dwi(t)
dt




= ẇj(t) = θ[Dj(wi(t), wj(t))− Sj(t)], (12)
where θ > 0 relates changes in waiting times to the difference between the demand faced by each
hospital and its activity (i.e., changes in the waiting list). Under this formulation, waiting times
increase when current demand exceeds current supply and vice versa, and the speed at which
waiting times respond to changes in demand or supply is given by θ.
We are implicitly assuming that the waiting time at each hospital is positive in every period.
The hospital objective function depends on the hospital’s supply decision, which is given by the
number of treatments performed by Hospital i in period t, Si(t). The objective function does not
instead depend directly on demand, which is given by the number of patients added to Hospital
i’s waiting list in period t, Di(wi(t), wj(t)). If Si(t) < Di(wi(t), wj(t)), there is a net increase
in the waiting list and the (expected or average) waiting time increases. On the other hand, if
Si(t) > Di(wi(t), wj(t)), there is a net reduction in the waiting list and the waiting time therefore
falls. In either case, as long as the waiting list is not emptied, the number of treatments performed
in period t is given by the hospital’s supply of treatments. Demand for treatments only affects the
actual number of treatments indirectly through waiting times, which in turn affect each hospital’s
optimal supply decisions, as we will show later.
We assume that the hospitals maximise their payoffs over an infinite time horizon and have a
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subject to ẇi(t) = θ[Di(wi(t), wj(t))− Si(t)],
ẇj(t) = θ[Dj(wi(t), wj(t))− Sj(t)],
wi(0) = wi0 > 0,
wj(0) = wj0 > 0.
Although, in reality, hospitals do not plan their activity over an infinite time horizon, we argue
that this is a reasonable approximation if hospitals are regarded as lasting institutions. Managerial
and medical structures are periodically replaced, but the hospital’s mission—to provide care given
its production technology and the regulatory scheme it faces—is likely to remain the same over
long periods of time. This is likely if hierarchies are substituted by others with similar objective
functions.
3.3 Solution concepts
There are two main solution concepts established by the differential-game literature (see Dockner
et al., 2000). Under the open-loop solution, hospitals either compute their optimal supply paths at
the beginning of the game and are restricted to follow such plans thereafter, or they may observe
the state of the world (i.e., waiting times) only at t = 0 and cannot therefore condition their
actions (i.e., supply) on these observations thereafter. In both cases, strategies are time-profiles
that specify the supply to be provided at each point in time.
If, besides current time, hospitals observe waiting times in every period and factor them in their
decision making, a closed-loop solution arises. Under this solution concept, Hospital i’s supply is
a function of the contemporaneous waiting times in each t. While the closed-loop solution is
informationally more demanding, it involves weaker commitment since hospitals are allowed to
adjust supply as waiting times evolve.
The appropriateness of each solution concept depends on the assumptions regarding the players’
information set as well as commitment requirements. The open-loop solution implies that hospitals
have no information concerning waiting times once the game starts or are committed to the supply
plans computed at the beginning of the game, which might be considered an excessively stringent
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assumption. Due to regulatory requirements, hospitals periodically collect and report data on
waiting times, upon which their activity may be conditioned.3 Moreover, a setting in which hospitals
adjust activity according to waiting times is more realistic and relevant for policy-making.4 Thus,
although the closed-loop solution is computationally much more demanding, it is based on a set
of assumptions that are arguably more realistic and we will therefore conduct our main analysis
under the assumption that hospital behaviour is characterised by closed-loop decision rules.
4 Treatment supply and waiting times in the closed-loop solution
Suppose that hospitals are able to observe the evolution of waiting times and make supply decisions
dependent on current waiting times. When solving for the closed-loop solution, we restrict attention
to Markovian stationary strategies, whereby the controls (i.e., supply decisions) at time t depend
only on the current values of the states (i.e, the waiting times), which summarise the history of the
game. We also focus on a symmetric equilibrium with non-negative waiting times and a partially
covered monopolistic segment.
We will present our results distinguishing between two different cases, namely constant and
increasing marginal provider disutility of waiting time. As mentioned above, which case is more
plausible depends on the institutional context and this may differ across countries or even within a
country at different points in time. For example, one could argue that in England in 2000-2005 the
marginal disutility was increasing in waiting times when senior health administrators risked losing
their jobs if targets were not met. This would be the case if small deviations from the target would
only lead to additional monitoring from the regulator, but a large deviation from the target would
culminate into the hospital CEO being dismissed. In contrast, the marginal disutility of waiting
time could be constant if deviations from a target led to a proportionate reduction in hospital
income, which was implemented later in England. Therefore, both scenarios are important from a
policy perspective. We discuss them in turn, starting with the case of constant marginal disutility,
which allows us to obtain closed-form solutions for equilibrium supply and waiting times.
3See Siciliani, Moran, and Borowitz (2013) for a description of waiting times regulatory arrangements and policies
across OECD countries.
4This need not be the case of other analyses of hospital behaviour. The case of quality competition as analysed in,
for example, Brekke et al. (2010) provides a setting in which the open-loop solution might be, at least, as appropriate.
If hospitals devise investment plans that ought to be followed for long periods of time, meaning that their discretion
is strongly restricted, their actions (investment decisions) are as if they are not conditional on the state of the world
(the stock of quality).
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4.1 Constant marginal provider disutility of waiting time
Suppose that the disutility of waiting time is given by (10) with α1 > 0 and α2 = 0. In this case,
it can be shown (see Appendix A) that the optimal supply rule for each hospital at time t is equal
to the steady-state supply, SCL, and given by









φ = θ(2− β)N + 2τρ− (θβN)
2
θ(2− β)N + 2τρ
∈ (0, 1). (14)
In other words, the optimal supply rule is independent of waiting times. We thus obtain the
following result:
Proposition 1 If the marginal provider disutility of waiting time is constant, the equilibrium is
characterised by constant supply of treatments over time.
This result is explained by the lack of strategic interaction between the hospitals when waiting
time disutility is linear in waiting times. A unilateral increase in supply by Hospital i leads to an
initial reduction in waiting times at this hospital. This will shift demand from the rival hospital
and therefore will also reduce the waiting time at Hospital j. However, if α2 = 0, the reduction in
waiting time at Hospital j does not affect the hospital’s marginal disutility of waiting time, so that
the hospital will not respond by changing its supply.5






On the one hand, a marginal increase in supply (i) generates more revenues and (ii) reduces the
waiting time and its associated disutility. These two elements of the marginal benefit of supply are
given by the two terms on the left-hand side of (15). On the other hand, increasing supply is costly,
with the marginal cost of supply given by the right-hand side of (15). Each hospital offers a supply
of treatments such that the marginal benefit is exactly offset by the marginal cost. This trade-off
is key to understanding the main intuition behind most of our subsequently derived results.
5When α2 = 0, our differential game belongs to the class of the so-called linear-state games, which is characterised
by the coincidence between the time path of controls and states under the open- and closed-loop solution concepts.
The calibration in Section 4.3 illustrates this general result.
15
It also follows directly from (15) that, in an interior-solution equilibrium, each hospital operates
at a level where the price-cost margin is negative, implying that the marginal patient is unprofitable
to treat.6 This is a result of the disutility of waiting time, which gives each hospital an incentive
to expand supply beyond the level where the price is equal to marginal treatment costs.




















We can see directly from (16) that the steady-state waiting time is decreasing in p and α1, which is
very intuitive. A higher price (p) makes the marginal patient more profitable (or less unprofitable)
to treat, whereas a higher waiting time penalty (α1) increases the disutility of waiting time. In
both cases, the hospitals have stronger incentives to increase supply and equilibrium waiting times
will therefore go down.
4.1.1 Patient choice and waiting times
How does the degree of patient choice affect steady-state supply and waiting times? In our frame-
work, the degree of patient choice can be inversely measured by the parameter τ , which is a standard
(inverse) measure of competition intensity in the hospital competition literature that is based on
models of spatial competition. A reduction in τ makes demand more responsive to changes in
waiting times, thus reflecting a higher degree of patient choice.














v − k − wCL
)





(1− β)[Nθ(2− β) + 4τρ]θN + (2− β)(τρ)2
2γ(Nθ + τρ)2[N(1− β)θ + τρ]2
> 0, (18)
allowing us to establish the following result:
Proposition 2 If the marginal provider disutility of waiting time is constant, a higher degree of
6Notice that, when treatment costs are strictly convex, a negative price-cost margin for the marginal patient does
not imply that the price-cost margin is negative for the average patient.
7In Appendix A, we show that a sufficiently large γ ensures that the steady-state is characterised by non-negative
waiting times and a partially covered monopolistic segment.
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patient choice leads to lower treatment supply and higher waiting times in the steady-state.
The negative relationship between τ and wCL is a consequence of two effects that work in the
same direction. First, there is a direct demand effect. A reduction in τ increases total demand
(and therefore demand for each hospital) since a larger number of patients in the monopolistic
segment chooses to opt for treatment (at the nearest hospital). A higher demand directly increases
the waiting time at each hospital. This effect is given by the first term in the numerator of (17),
and the size of this effect is smaller the larger the relative size of the competitive segment, β.
The second effect is related to how τ affects the demand responsiveness to waiting times in the
competitive segment of demand, and is thus more directly related to the patient choice interpre-
tation of the parameter τ . This is an indirect effect that works through changes in each hospital’s
incentive to affect waiting times through its treatment supply decision. Each hospital can lower
its waiting time by increasing the supply of treatments, and the effect of a unilateral increase in
treatment supply on the waiting time is given by a direct and an indirect (feedback) effect. For
a given demand, an increase in treatment supply will reduce the waiting time. However, a lower
waiting time will increase demand and therefore dampen the initial reduction in the waiting time.
Crucially, the strength of this feedback effect depends on how strongly demand responds to wait-
ing time changes. A lower τ makes demand more responsive to changes in waiting times, which
increases the feedback effect and therefore makes treatment supply a less effective instrument to
reduce waiting times. Consequently, this reduces the marginal benefit of treatment supply and
gives each hospital an incentive to reduce the supply of treatments. This effect is captured by the
second term in the numerator of (17).
Notice that the effect of a reduction in τ on steady-state supply does not depend on the direct
demand effect, only on the indirect effect through demand responsiveness. Consider the special case
of no waiting time disutility, α1 = 0. In this case, the second effect vanishes, since the hospitals
have no incentives to adjust supply in order to affect waiting times. A reduction in τ will not
affect the hospitals’ supply decisions and waiting times increase only because of higher demand
(i.e., waiting times increase only through the first of the two above mentioned effects). Thus, it is
the presence of waiting time disutility (α1 > 0) that causes a negative relationship between patient
choice and treatment supply. This has potentially interesting policy implications which we will
explore in the following.
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4.1.2 Combining patient choice policies with waiting time penalties
Suppose that policymakers aim at reducing hospital waiting times. Two commonly suggested policy
options is to either directly target the perceived problem by introducing (or increasing) waiting time
penalties, or to stimulate patient choice (e.g., by public reporting of waiting times) with the aim
of achieving lower waiting times through increased intensity of competition between the hospitals.
In our model, as Proposition 1 shows, only the former policy works, whereas the latter policy is
counterproductive. Moreover, the former policy makes the latter policy more counterproductive.
All else equal, the larger the waiting time penalties, the larger is the increase in steady-state waiting
times as a result of more patient choice.
Many countries have introduced both choice policies and waiting time penalties. While our
analysis shows that these two policies have counteracting effects on treatment supply and waiting
times, it remains to show what determines the direction of the overall effect in a context where the
two policies are combined. Consider therefore a policy package consisting of a marginal increase in
the degree of patient choice combined with a marginal increase in the waiting time penalty. The


















If we exclude the demand effect of lower travelling costs, thus focusing exclusively on the patient
choice interpretation of τ , the overall effect of this dual policy on waiting times is given by the sign
of the second term in the square brackets of on the right-hand side of (19). It can easily be shown
that the sign of this effect is positive, implying higher waiting times, if
α1 >
(Nθ + τρ) ((1− β)Nθ + τρ) ((2− β)Nθ + 2τρ) τ
Nθ (Nθ (1− β) ((2− β)Nθ + 4τρ) + (2− β) τ2ρ2)
. (20)
Thus, a combined policy of increased patient choice and higher waiting time penalties is more
likely to yield higher waiting times (and lower treatment supply) if the disutility of waiting time
is sufficiently high to begin with. The reason is that the marginal effect of a higher waiting time
penalty on waiting times is constant (as we can see from (16)), whereas the marginal effect of in-
creased patient choice on waiting times is increasing in the disutility of waiting times. Consequently,
the counterproductive effect of increased patient choice dominates for sufficiently high values of α1.
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It can also be shown that, unless β is very close to 1, the right-hand side of (20) is decreasing in θ
and approaches τ as θ →∞. This implies that the scope for a waiting time increase as a result of
the combined policy is larger the faster waiting times adjust to changes in supply.
If we interpret the waiting time disutility as reflecting only waiting time penalties, we can
summarise the above policy analysis as follows:
Proposition 3 Suppose that waiting time penalties are linear in waiting times. In this case, (i) the
counterproductive effect of patient choice policies on treatment supply and waiting times is larger
the higher the waiting time penalty. Furthermore, (ii) a combined policy of increased patient choice
and higher waiting time penalties has an ambiguous effect on treatment supply and waiting times,
but is more likely to be counterproductive the higher the initial waiting time penalty.
4.2 Increasing marginal provider disutility of waiting time
Suppose that the disutility of waiting time is given by (10) with α1 > 0 and α2 > 0. In this scenario,
a closed-form solution of supply and waiting times cannot be obtained. Our game belongs to the
class of linear-quadratic differential games wherein the state variables enter the objective function
quadratically, while they enter the dynamic constraints linearly. Although the closed-loop solution
of linear-quadratic games may generally be computed analytically, this is not always assured. This is
the case of our model whose particular structure features both state variables entering the dynamic
constraints and has algebraic properties that limit the tractability of its closed-loop solution.
We are, however, able to solve for the solution numerically. To make the analysis more salient
and policy relevant, we take this constraint as an opportunity to calibrate the model based on
real data and available empirical evidence. The rest of this subsection characterises some general
features of the solution, and the next one provides the calibration of the closed-loop solution.
Proposition 4 If the marginal provider disutility of waiting time is increasing, the optimal closed-
loop supply rule for Hospital i is given by:
Si(wi, wj , t) =
p− θ(ω1 + ω3wi(t) + ω5wj(t))
γ
, (21)
where ω3 < 0 is required by the concavity of the value function and ω5 ∈ Ω.
See Appendix A for the definition Ω and proof of Proposition 4.
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In contrast to the case of constant marginal disutility of waiting time, a dynamic strategic
interaction is present when the marginal disutility is increasing. This implies that the equilibrium
supply of Hospital i at time t depends both on own waiting time, wi (t), and the waiting time
at Hospital j, wj (t). Considering first the relationship between optimal treatment supply and
own waiting time, ω3 < 0 implies that an increase in the waiting time of Hospital i increases
the hospital’s optimal treatment supply. The reason is that a longer waiting time increases the
hospital’s marginal disutility of waiting time and therefore increases the marginal benefit of supply.
The relationship between the treatment supply at Hospital i and the waiting time at Hospital
j is determined be the sign of ω5. Although it is not possible to unambiguously determine the
sign of ω5 analytically (see Appendix A), our calibration results provided in the next subsection
show that ω5 is negative for all the parameter configurations considered. If ω5 is negative, then
hospitals’ supply decisions are characterised by strategic substitutability, ∂Si(wi, wj)/∂wj > 0, for
which we provide the following intuition. Consider a unilateral increase in supply by Hospital i.
This leads to lower waiting times at Hospital i, which in turn shifts demand from Hospital j to
Hospital i, causing a reduction in waiting times also at Hospital j. A lower waiting time at Hospital
j reduces its marginal disutility of waiting time, and thus its marginal benefit of supply. Hospital
j will therefore optimally respond by reducing its supply of treatments. In other words, a supply
increase by Hospital i triggers a supply decrease by Hospital j.
The above described strategic interaction has important implications for the supply incentives
of each hospital. Consider once more a unilateral increase in supply by Hospital i, which leads to
an initial reduction in waiting time at this hospital. However, because of strategic substitutability,
Hospital j will respond by reducing its supply, as explained above. The subsequent increase in
waiting time at Hospital j shifts some demand towards Hospital i, thereby dampening the initial
reduction in the waiting time caused by the supply increase of Hospital i. Thus, dynamic strategic
substitutability lowers the marginal benefit of treatment supply, giving each hospital an incentive to
reduce its own supply in order to ‘free-ride’ on the subsequent supply increase of the rival hospital.
In Appendix A, we also show that, if the initial waiting times are the same in both hospitals or
if the average initial waiting time equals the steady-state waiting time, then waiting times, supply
and demand in both segments of the market converge monotonically to the steady-state. In this
case, if the condition |ω3| > |ω5| holds, the equilibrium path to the steady-state is characterised by
periods of increasing (decreasing) hospital activity and increasing (decreasing) waiting time, which
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is in line with Siciliani (2006) in a monopoly setting. Notice that |ω3| > |ω5| implies that the own
waiting time effect on hospital activity is larger than the effect of the waiting time of the competing
hospital, which is both intuitive and confirmed by our calibration exercise below.8
However, non-monotonic convergence may also arise. In Appendix A we show that, if the
average initial waiting time is above (below) the steady-state waiting time, the hospital with the
shortest (longest) initial waiting time might experience a non-monotonic convergence along the
equilibrium path, with the waiting time first increasing (decreasing) before decreasing (increasing)
towards the steady-state. One policy implication is that short-run provider performance on waiting
times may not be representative of its long-run one.
4.3 Calibration
We calibrate the model using data from the English NHS on cataract surgery, which is a common
non-emergency procedure across OECD countries (Siciliani et al., 2014). Our two key variables in
the model are the steady-state waiting time and supply.
Waiting time data for cataract surgery is obtained from the Hospital Episode Statistics published
by NHS Digital. Table 1 reports the mean and median waiting times (in days) for a cataract
procedure provided either by NHS hospitals or the independent sector (private hospitals treating
publicly-funded patients).9
Table 1. Evolution of waiting times for cataract procedures in the English NHS
Financial year 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17
Mean waiting time 66 67 71 70 70 70
Median waiting time 59 60 63 62 59 58
Waiting times have remained relatively stable in recent years. They coincide with a period in
which NHS England (the main regulator) did not specify performance standards for non-emergency
care (The King’s Fund, 2017). We interpret this as a regime where no significant penalties have been
imposed on providers with longer waits. Within our model this corresponds to the special case when
there is no hospital disutility of waiting time (α1 = α2 = 0). We therefore use the data in Table 1
8Additionally, it follows from equations (A.21) and (A.22) in Appendix A that |ω3| > |ω5| is a sufficient (but not
necessary) condition for convergence to be verified.
9Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) code BZ02Z, Phacoemulsification Cataract Extraction and Lens Implant,
in the HRG4 classification system. In 2011-12, episodes were grouped according to the HRG3.5 version, and the
corresponding HRG code is B13.
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as a measure of waiting times in a steady-state with no penalties, which we denote by superscript
s. To make the analysis consistent with the study of Propper et al. (2010), we employ the mean
waiting time, measured in months, and focus on the financial year 2016-17, giving ws = 2.3.
According to the National Schedule of Reference Costs from NHS Improvement, 234 NHS
providers performed 286, 596 cataract procedures in the same year.10 This gives a monthly average
of approximately 100 procedures per provider, so that Ss = Ds = 100.
On the supply side, two key parameters are the tariff for a cataract surgery (the DRG-type
price) and the marginal cost of treatment. From the National Schedule of Reference Costs, the
national tariff in 2016-17 for a cataract procedure was 731£. We set p = 731. Given that the
first-order condition Ss = p/γ has to hold (when α1 = α2 = 0), we recover the parameter related
to the marginal cost of treatment, γ = 7.31.
On the demand side, the key parameters are the potential demand, the size of the competitive
segment, the demand responsiveness, the gross valuation of treatment, and the value of the outside
option. These parameters are less easy to obtain but we infer them in the following way. According
to OECD (2018), 10.5% of the UK population was covered by private health insurance in 2015.
We assume that patients with private insurance opt for private treatment and that publicly-funded
cataract procedures account for about 90% of the market.11 Given that the steady-state supply in
each hospital is Ss = 100, potential demand across the two hospitals is then given by N = 222.
Sivey (2012) estimates a demand elasticity for cataract surgery across NHS providers that is
approximately −0.1. The waiting time elasticity of demand evaluated at the steady-state values














We do not know how large is the competitive segment. In order to account for patient heterogeneity,
we conduct the analysis for three different values, β = {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}. We start by assuming β = 0.2,
so that the competitive segment accounts for 20% of potential demand and is therefore relatively
small, and then check how the results differ when it is 50% and 80% (relatively large). If β = 0.2,
then, from (22), the demand elasticity implies that τ = 45.954. Moreover, from the demand
10The National Schedule of Reference Costs is detailed according to the HRG4+ classification system, which
presents a more thorough description of cataract episodes than the HRG4. Focusing on Phacoemulsification Cataract
Extraction and Lens Implant, the HRGs considered are BZ34A, BZ34B, and BZ34C in HRG4+.
11This is an approximation since some patients without private insurance may also obtain private care if they pay
out of pocket and some with private insurance may not seek private care if they face co-payments.
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we can recover the difference between the gross valuation of treatment and the value of the outside
option: v − k = 22.4308. If β = 0.5, then, from (22), we obtain τ = 38.295 and, from (23), we
obtain v− k = 17.653. If β = 0.8, then, from (22), we obtain τ = 30.636 and, from (23), we obtain
v − k = 10.028. We have thus recovered the demand-side parameters for β = {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}.
We adopt a discount factor of 0.95 per year and take each period t as one month. The monthly
discount rate is therefore ρ = 0.004 (computed from e−12ρ = 0.95).
In the steady-state, it takes one month for Hospital i to treat 100 patients. This implies
that, if 10 additional patients are added to the list, the waiting time will increase by 0.1 months





10 = 0.01 in the neighbourhood of the steady-state.
We are interested in understanding provider behaviour in the presence of penalties. We therefore
need to identify plausible values for α1 and α2 under a penalty regime. In order to do this, we make
use of the open-loop solution, for which we can derive a closed-form solution for the steady-state
waiting time when α2 > 0 (see Appendix B). We denote variables in the open-loop steady-state by
the superscript OL. Propper et al. (2010) find that the introduction of waiting time penalties in the
English NHS in 2000-05 reduced the mean waiting time by 13 days (i.e., 0.43 months). Although
this estimate refers to an earlier period, it provides us with a plausible order of magnitude if such
penalties were re-introduced in 2016-17. We then use this figure to compute the difference between
the steady-state waiting time in the model with no disutility of waiting time and the open-loop
steady-state waiting time, which is given by
ws−wOL = 2.3− γφτ

















Inserting the above described parameter values when β = 0.2, the solution to (24) has one degree
of freedom and is given by
α2 = 30.5274− 0.53486α1. (25)
All α1 and α2 that satisfy (25) yield a reduction of 0.43 months in the open-loop steady-state
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waiting time compared to the case with no disutility of waiting time. We consider three disutility
structures: (i) linear disutility (α2 = 0), yielding α1 = 57.0826; (ii) quadratic disutility (α1 = 0),
yielding α2 = 30.5274; and (iii) an intermediate case in which α1 =
57.0826
2 and α2 =
30.5274
2 .
We insert all parameter values and solve the system (A.6)-(A.8) in Appendix A to yield ω1, ω3,
and ω5, which are plugged into (A.27) to obtain the closed-loop steady-state waiting time. With
ω1, ω3, ω5, and w
CL, we use (21) to retrieve the closed-loop steady-state supply. For the open-loop
steady-state waiting time and supply, we insert the parameter values into equations (B.6) and (B.8)
in Appendix B.
The same steps were then repeated for β = 0.5 and β = 0.8.
4.3.1 Linear versus convex waiting time disutility
The results generated by the above described calibration procedure are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2. Calibration results for a waiting time elasticity of demand of −0.1
β α1 α2 w
OL wCL SOL SCL ω3 ω5
0.2 57.0862 0 1.8700 1.8700 101.6620 101.6620 0 0
0.2 28.5431 15.2637 1.8700 1.8703 101.6620 101.6609 −164.6061 −8.3753
0.2 0 30.5274 1.8700 1.8705 101.6620 101.6600 −321.6537 −15.3715
0.5 39.2269 0 1.8700 1.8700 101.2464 101.2464 0 0
0.5 19.6143 10.4885 1.8700 1.8720 101.2464 101.2402 −119.1899 −19.2189
0.5 0 20.9769 1.8700 1.8734 101.2464 101.2353 −233.5920 −36.3039
0.8 13.5675 0 1.8700 1.8700 100.6232 100.6232 0 0
0.8 6.7837 3.6277 1.8700 1.8755 100.6232 100.6147 −52.3298 −20.3702
0.8 0 7.2553 1.8700 1.8795 100.6232 100.6077 −102.5480 −38.9404
Our calibration results confirm that, as explained in Section 4.2, the dynamic interaction intro-
duced by increasing marginal disutility of waiting time leads to longer steady-state waiting times.
As the waiting time disutility becomes more convex (i.e., more weight is placed on the quadratic
term), the longer is the waiting time and the lower is supply in the closed-loop steady-state. The
reason is simply that a more convex disutility function increases the magnitude of each hospital’s
supply response to changes in the waiting time, which reinforces each hospital’s incentive to reduce
supply in order to provoke a supply increase by the rival hospital, which in turn benefits the former
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hospital in the form of a lower waiting time. This result has potentially interesting policy impli-
cations, as it suggests that linear penalties are more effective in reducing waiting times, all else
equal. Notice also that the importance of the design of the penalty structure is larger for higher
values of the competitive segment, β. This is intuitive, since the strategic substitutability relies on
the existence of a competitive segment, wherein changes in the waiting time at one hospital affect
demand faced by the rival hospital. Thus, a larger relative size of the competitive segment will
magnify the effects of strategic substitutability.
Besides confirming that they coincide when α2 = 0, another key insight from Table 2 is that
the difference in waiting times under the open- and closed-loop solutions is very small (less than
1%) when α2 > 0. This suggests that, even with non-linear penalties, the less computationally
demanding open-loop solution offers a close approximation of the closed-loop one.
4.3.2 Higher waiting time elasticity of demand
One may worry that the results from Table 2 are due to the low demand elasticity. We therefore
extend the analysis under the assumption that the waiting time elasticity is higher. We consider
two additional cases. First, we assume that the elasticity is −0.2, twice as large, which is the highest
that has been reported in studies for England (see Iversen and Siciliani (2011) for an overview).
Second, we assume that the elasticity is −1. This is an upper bound. There is only one study
from Australia which provides such a large estimate (Stavrunova and Yerokhin, 2011), and this is
consistent with the features of the Australian health system where more than half of the population
is treated privately. Tables 3 and 4 provide the results for waiting time elasticities of demand of
−0.2 and −1, respectively, and they are derived following the steps detailed above. We see that an
increase in the waiting time elasticity of demand reinforces the relative effectiveness of linear (as
opposed to convex) waiting time penalties. Still, the quantitative difference between steady-state
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waiting times in the open- and closed-loop solutions remains small.
Table 3. Calibration results for a waiting time elasticity of demand of −0.2
β α1 α2 w
OL wCL SOL SCL ω3 ω5
0.2 218.4948 0 1.8700 1.8700 103.3237 103.3237 0 0
0.2 109.2474 58.4211 1.8700 1.8703 103.3237 103.3212 −322.1649 −16.7563
0.2 0 116.8421 1.8700 1.8705 103.3237 103.3193 −629.5163 −31.3129
0.5 148.9097 0 1.8700 1.8700 102.4928 102.4928 0 0
0.5 74.4548 39.8154 1.8700 1.8722 102.4928 102.4791 −231.9189 −38.3288
0.5 0 79.6308 1.8700 1.8738 102.4928 102.4683 −454.4837 −72.3946
0.8 49.2070 0 1.8700 1.8700 101.2464 101.2464 0 0
0.8 24.6037 13.1571 1.8700 1.8762 101.2464 101.2272 −98.9201 −39.8422
0.8 0 26.3142 1.8700 1.8807 101.2464 101.2115 −193.7462 −76.1410
Table 4. Calibration results for a waiting time elasticity of demand of −1
β α1 α2 w
OL wCL SOL SCL ω3 ω5
0.2 5265.7273 0 1.8700 1.8700 116.6184 116.6184 0 0
0.2 2632.8636 1407.9485 1.8700 1.8703 116.6184 116.6049 −1581.6013 −83.7851
0.2 0 2815.8969 1.8700 1.8706 116.6184 116.5947 −3090.4383 −156.5665
0.5 3561.6215 0 1.8700 1.8700 112.4638 112.4638 0 0
0.5 1788.8108 952.3052 1.8700 1.8724 112.4638 112.3893 −1132.2781 −190.9560
0.5 0 1904.6104 1.8700 1.8741 112.4638 112.3307 −2218.7774 −360.6664
0.8 1126.6109 0 1.8700 1.8700 106.2319 106.2319 0 0
0.8 563.3055 301.2329 1.8700 1.8769 106.2319 106.1257 −469.2457 −194.4604
0.8 0 602.4657 1.8700 1.8818 106.2319 106.0397 −918.7196 −371.5998
4.3.3 Higher waiting times and hospital heterogeneity
In this section, we investigate whether our calibration results are robust to providers with longer
waiting times. We simulate scenarios in which the baseline waiting time is 50% higher (i.e., ws =
3.45). This is in line with Sivey (2012), who finds that the standard deviation of waiting times for
cataract patients is about half of the mean wait.
Since long waiting times may be observed both at hospitals with high and low volumes, we
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recalibrate the model with the higher baseline waiting time (ws = 3.45) and set steady-state
supply respectively at Ss = 300 (high volume) and Ss = 50 (low volume) in Tables 5 and 6. This
is in line with HES data that reveal significant dispersion in hospital volumes even at the upper
tail of the waiting times distribution across all procedures.12
By repeating the steps outlined at the beginning of Section 4.3, we obtain the results in Tables
5 and 6, which show that the effect of linear versus convex penalties is qualitatively similar to
our previously derived results (in Tables 2-4). And again, the waiting times under the open-loop
solution are very similar to those under closed-loop solution.
Table 5. Calibration results for larger hospitals and a higher baseline waiting time
β α1 α2 w
OL wCL SOL SCL ω3 ω5
0.2 79.3777 0 3.0200 3.0200 303.3237 303.3237 0 0
0.2 39.6889 13.1420 3.0200 3.0202 303.3237 303.3224 −209.9135 −10.6351
0.2 0 26.2840 3.0200 3.0203 303.3237 303.3214 −413.6013 −20.3550
0.5 54.9493 0 3.0200 3.0200 302.4928 302.4928 0 0
0.5 27.4747 9.0976 3.0200 3.0212 302.4928 302.4860 −152.6061 −24.3845
0.5 0 18.1951 3.0200 3.0222 302.4928 302.4803 −301.2599 −47.0010
0.8 19.7392 0 3.0200 3.0200 301.2464 301.2464 0 0
0.8 9.8696 3.2681 3.0200 3.0232 301.2464 301.2374 −68.5619 −26.0926
0.8 0 6.5362 3.0200 3.0258 301.2464 301.2294 −135.3564 −50.6886
12In 2016-17, the standard deviation of finished consultant episodes for hospitals above the 90th percentile of the
waiting times distribution was over three times larger than the mean.
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Table 6. Calibration results for smaller hospitals and a higher baseline waiting time
β α1 α2 w
OL wCL SOL SCL ω3 ω5
0.2 13.2296 0 3.0200 3.0200 50.5539 50.5539 0 0
0.2 6.6148 2.1903 3.0200 3.0202 50.5539 50.5537 −34.9856 −1.7725
0.2 0 4.3807 3.0200 3.0203 50.5539 50.5536 −68.9335 −3.3925
0.5 9.1582 0 3.0200 3.0200 50.4155 50.4155 0 0
0.5 4.5791 1.5163 3.0200 3.0212 50.4155 50.4143 −25.4343 −4.0641
0.5 0 3.0325 3.0200 3.0222 50.4155 50.4134 −50.2100 −7.8335
0.8 3.2899 0 3.0200 3.0200 50.2077 50.2077 0 0
0.8 1.6449 0.5447 3.0200 3.0232 50.2077 50.2062 −11.4270 −4.3488
0.8 0 1.0894 3.0200 3.0258 50.2077 50.2049 −22.5594 −8.4481
4.3.4 Patient choice and waiting times
One of our main aims is to analyse the relationship between patient choice and waiting times. In
line with the analysis in Section 4.1.1, we therefore conduct comparative statics with respect to the
patient choice parameter τ . The fourth and fifth columns of Table 7 show the effects (on steady-
state waiting times and supply) of a 10% reduction in τ , with all other parameters kept unchanged
from our main calibration analysis, which implies that the results displayed in Table 2 serve as a
reference point of comparison. In the last two columns of Table 7, we report the equivalent effects
of a combined policy package, where a 10% reduction in τ is accompanied by a 10% increase in
waiting time penalties (equivalent to the analysis in Section 4.1.2).
In qualitative terms, the effects of increased patient choice on steady-state waiting times and
supply, as shown in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 7, confirm that the result stated in
Proposition 2 generalises beyond the case of constant marginal disutility of waiting time. Regardless
of the shape of the hospitals’ waiting time disutility function, a reduction in τ leads to higher
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steady-state waiting times.13
Table 7. Steady-state effects of policy reforms
Patient choice1 Joint policy2
β α1 α2 ∆%w
CL ∆%SCL ∆%wCL ∆%SCL
0.2 57.0862 0 111.86 −0.15 109.98 0
0.2 28.5431 15.2637 102.24 0.61 99.67 0.82
0.2 0 30.5274 94.15 1.25 91.14 1.49
0.5 39.2269 0 86.27 −0.11 84.39 0
0.5 19.6143 10.4885 78.76 0.33 76.41 0.47
0.5 0 20.9769 72.52 0.70 69.87 0.85
0.8 13.5675 0 45.34 −0.05 43.45 0.01
0.8 6.7837 3.6277 41.25 0.07 39.23 0.12
0.8 0 7.2553 37.93 0.17 35.85 0.23
110% reduction in τ
210% reduction in τ and 10% increase in α1 and/or α2
However, even if more patient choice increases steady-state waiting times for all parameter
configurations considered in Table 7, there is a clear pattern showing that this effect is quantitatively
smaller if the waiting time disutility is more convex. The reason is that a reduction in τ has two
counteracting effects on steady-state supply when α2 > 0. On the one hand, a lower τ makes
treatment supply a less effective instrument to reduce waiting times, as previously explained, which
gives each hospital an incentive to reduce their supply. On the other hand, a lower τ also increases
demand (from the monopolistic segment), which—all else equal—leads to higher waiting times.
If the disutility of waiting time is strictly convex (i.e., if α2 > 0), such increase in waiting time
increases the marginal disutility of waiting time and therefore increases the marginal benefit of
supply. In other words, with a strictly convex waiting time disutility function, the waiting time
increase due to increased patient choice is partly dampened by the hospitals’ incentives to increase
supply in response to higher waiting times. Indeed, the fifth column in Table 7 shows that steady-
state supply increases for the parameter configurations with α2 > 0.
13In the open-loop solution, for which a closed-form solution can be derived also in the case of increasing marginal
waiting time disutility (see Appendix B), it is also easily shown that a reduction in τ leads to higher steady-state
waiting times for all parameter values that are compatible with equilibrium existence.
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This illustrates another aspect of the inherent conflict between waiting time penalties and
patient choice policies, as previously discussed in Section 4.1.2. On the one hand, waiting time
penalties are more effective in reducing waiting times when they are designed as linear penalties
(as shown by Tables 2-6). On the other hand, the counterproductive effect of patient choice policies
on waiting times is larger when penalties are linear (as shown by Table 7).
The last two columns of Table 7 show the effects of a policy package where the increased in
patient choice is combined with a (10%) increases in waiting time penalties. Not surprisingly, this
dampens the increase in waiting times induced by more patient choice. However, we see that the
patient choice effect clearly dominates, implying that such a policy package leads to an overall
increase in steady-state waiting times.
5 Patient Welfare
In this section, we briefly investigate the effect of choice policies on overall patient welfare. In the






(v − wCL − τx)dx+ 2N(1− β)
∫ xCLM
0
(v − k − wCL − τx)dx, (26)










+ (1− β)(xCLM )2
]
. (27)
The first term is negative and captures the utility loss due to longer waiting times endured by
all patients. The second term is positive and captures the utility increase from lower travelling
costs, which we interpret more broadly as simpler access to health care. Note that there is a third
term since an increase in waiting times reduces demand at the margin, but given that the marginal
patient is indifferent between treatment and no treatment, this has no effect on welfare. Therefore,
the effect of choice policies on overall welfare is indeterminate and is positive only if the direct
effect of easier access overcomes the utility loss from longer waiting times.
The above approach takes a utilitarian perspective. Suppose that a health authority or regulator
(a Ministry of Health) is only interested in the health component of patient welfare (Gravelle and
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Siciliani, 2008c). This approach has been sometimes referred as the extra-welfarist approach since
it ignores non-health components which affect patient utility. Aggregate health patient benefit,





(v − wCL)dx+ 2N(1− β)
∫ xCLM
0
(v − k − wCL)dx, (28)










If providers’ penalties are linear in waiting times, patient choice policies increase waiting times
for each patient and reduce supply with fewer patients gaining a health benefit from treatment,
thus unambiguously reducing aggregate health benefits.
If providers’ penalties are non-linear in waiting times, choice policies simultaneously increase
waiting times and supply. Therefore, the effect on aggregate health benefit is in principle ambiguous.
However, our calibration exercise shows that the supply effect is a second-order effect and that
patient choice reduces aggregate health benefit also when α2 > 0. In more detail, Table 8 reports
the percent change in B and U induced by a 10% reduction in τ , which is computed using the
welfare values associated with Tables 2 and 7.
Table 8. Steady-state effects of a 10% reduction in τ on patient welfare
β α1 α2 ∆%w
CL ∆%SCL ∆%U ∆%B
0.2 57.0862 0 111.86 −0.15 −9.81 −10.04
0.2 28.5431 15.2637 102.24 0.61 −8.10 −8.52
0.2 0 30.5274 94.15 1.25 −6.66 −7.23
0.5 39.2269 0 86.27 −0.11 −8.26 −9.22
0.5 19.6143 10.4885 78.76 0.33 −6.70 −8.08
0.5 0 20.9769 72.52 0.70 −5.38 −7.12
0.8 13.5675 0 45.34 −0.05 −1.71 −5.88
0.8 6.7837 3.6277 41.25 0.07 −0.69 −5.31
0.8 0 7.2553 37.93 0.17 0.15 −4.84
31
6 Robustness
In order to facilitate analytical tractability, our model has a linear-quadratic structure. One impli-
cation is that patient (dis)utility is assumed to be linear in waiting times, and travelling costs are
linear in distance. Here we will briefly evaluate whether our main result—that more patient choice
leads to increased waiting times—is robust to a relaxation of these assumptions. Unfortunately, it
is only possible to perform these robustness checks in the context of the open-loop solution. How-
ever, our previous analysis has shown that the open-loop solution is a very close approximation
of the closed-loop solution in our setting. The two solutions coincide if α2 = 0, and our calibra-
tion results show that the two solutions concepts produce quantitatively almost identical results if
α2 > 0. More importantly, the positive relationship between patient choice and waiting times does
not depend on the choice of the solution concept.
6.1 Non-linear patient disutility of waiting
Suppose that, in the patient utility functions (1) and (2), we replace wi with a strictly increasing
function f (wi). Total demand for Hospital i is then given by
















Let wOL be the steady-state waiting time in the open-loop solution. In Appendix B, we show that
this solution exists if f (·) is either concave or convex with a sufficiently low degree of convexity.
Furthermore, we also show that, under the conditions of equilibrium existence, ∂wOL/∂τ < 0.
Thus:
Proposition 5 Regardless of whether patient utility is concave or convex in waiting time, the
steady-state waiting time in the open-loop solution, if it exists, is increasing in the degree of patient
choice.
This result is not surprising, given the intuition behind the previously derived positive relation-
ship between patient choice and steady-state waiting times, which is related to the responsiveness
of demand to changes in waiting times. As long as increased patient choice makes demand more
responsive to changes in waiting times, it becomes more difficult for each hospital to curb waiting
times by unilaterally increasing supply, which in turn leads to longer steady-state waiting times
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at both hospitals. This mechanism only requires that patient utility decreases with longer waiting
times; it does not depend on whether patient utility decreases at a faster or slower rate when
waiting times increase. Thus, we conjecture that the result stated in Proposition 5 also hold in a
closed-loop setting.
6.2 Non-linear patient disutility of travelling
Consider next the case where, in the patient utility functions (1) and (2), we replace |x− zi| with
a strictly increasing function g (|x− zi|). This generalisation prevents a closed-form derivation of



















τ [g′(xC(t)) + g′(1− xC(t))]
> 0. (32)
Still using τ as an inverse measure of the degree of patient choice, we derive (see Appendix B) the
following result:
Proposition 6 (i) The steady-state waiting time in the open-loop solution is increasing in the
degree of patient choice if the patient disutility of travelling is either concave or not strongly convex
in travelling distance. (ii) In the case of constant marginal provider disutility of waiting time, the
open-loop steady-state waiting time is increasing in the degree of patient choice if it exists.
Thus, unless patient utility is strongly convex in travelling distance, our main result holds also
in the case of non-linear patient disutility of travelling. And it always holds in the case of linear
waiting time penalties, given that the open-loop solution exists. The general condition stated in
Proposition 6 covers, for example, the empirical specification of Sivey (2012), who assumes that
the utility of English cataract patients is a function of the natural log of travel time.
7 Concluding remarks
We have investigated whether increased competition through patient choice policies play a useful
role in reducing waiting times and the extent to which such a role is altered in the presence
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of penalties for providers with long waits. Our main results suggest, perhaps surprisingly, that
increased patient choice leads to higher waiting times and that patient choice policies are therefore
counterproductive in this respect. Furthermore, in the presence of waiting time penalties, we have
shown that larger penalties make patient choice policies even more counterproductive.
The counterproductive effect of patient choice policies follows from the fact that increased pa-
tient choice makes each hospital’s demand more responsive to changes in waiting times, which in
turn makes it harder for each hospital to reduce waiting times by unilaterally increasing supply.
In other words, increased patient choice makes each hospital’s supply decision a less effective in-
strument to reduce waiting times, thereby leading to higher waiting times in equilibrium. This is
a highly robust result which, in qualitative terms, does not depend on the choice of game-theoretic
solution concept (closed-loop versus open-loop), nor on the design of the waiting time penalty
structure (linear versus convex penalties). We have also shown that this result is robust to a fairly
general patient utility specification. The result holds when patients’ disutility of waiting is non-
linear, and it also holds when patients’ disutility of travelling is non-linear (though not too strongly
convex).
While our main result might perhaps appear counterintuitive, it is consistent with a recent
empirical study which shows that the introduction of patient choice policies in England since 2006
led to an increase in waiting times for hip and knee replacement (with one additional rival increasing
waiting times by about 3-4%) and had no effect on waiting times for coronary bypass (Moscelli
et al., 2019) or the proportion of patients waiting more than three months (Gaynor et al., 2013,
footnote 16). Our results are also in line with an earlier study which showed that, for hip and knee
replacement, hospitals facing more competition had higher readmissions (Moscelli et al., 2018a).
Therefore, it appears that waiting times and quality worsened for some elective treatments, despite
the improvements found for heart attack mortality and overall mortality (Cooper et al., 2011;
Gaynor et al., 2013), and for hip fracture mortality (Moscelli et al., 2018b).
Our findings are instead in contrast with the older study by Propper, Burgess, and Gossage
(2008), which found that competition in the late nineties reduced waiting times in England. How-
ever, this result was obtained in a different institutional setting than the one covered in our study.
Patients had no or very limited choice. Hospitals prices were not fixed, but negotiated between
health authorities and providers. Clinical quality measures were not available to the funders so
that providers competed for funding from health authorities based on prices and waiting times.
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As mentioned in the Introduction, countries like Denmark and Portugal have introduced patient
choice policies. Although there is no evaluation study, in Denmark, waiting times reduced to some
extent following the introduction of patient choice (and other) policies. These however can be
explained by an expansion in capacity since the use of private providers to treat publicly-funded
patients increased from 2 to 4% (Siciliani et al., 2013). Moreover, in Denmark, hospitals did not
face any direct penalties for longer waiting times. In Portugal, preliminary evidence from 2016-2017
suggests that following the introduction of choice policies, median waiting time for first outpatient
consultation increased in five specialties and reduced in two specialties (Simões et al., 2017). This
suggests that choice policies did not have the intended effect of stimulating higher supply.
In summary, our model and analysis suggest that although policies based on provider penalties
will have the intended effect in reducing waiting times, policies which stimulate patient choice and
competition will not.
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Appendix A: Closed-loop solution
Given the linear-quadratic structure of our model, we conjecture that the value function for Hospital
i takes the form:






w2j + ω5wiwj . (A.1)
This value function must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for Hospital i, which
is given by14
ρV i(wi, wj) = max
{
T + pSi −
γ
2












Maximisation of the right-hand side of the HJB equations yields:
Si(wi, wj) =
p− θ(ω1 + ω3wi + ω5wj)
γ
. (A.3)
Substituting Hospital i’s supply rule and the analogous supply rule for Hospital j into the HJB
14To save notation, we omit the time index t in all subsequent expressions.
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equation, together with (7)-(8), we obtain:
ρV i(wi, wj) = T + p
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N + (1− β)
(
v − k − wi
τ
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N − θγ p.
For the equality to hold, the terms in curly brackets in the above equation have to be equal to
zero. Since the last three terms depend only on ω3, ω4, and ω5, we focus on the system of three






















































ω4ω5 = 0. (A.8)
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A.1 Constant marginal waiting time disutility
Consider first the closed-loop solution under constant marginal waiting time disutility. When
α2 = 0, the system of equations (A.6)-(A.8) has a single candidate solution for which the value
function is not convex with respect to wi. The remaining five candidates have ω3 > 0 and cannot
therefore constitute a solution the hospital’s maximisation problem. The solution that yields a
linear—hence, concave—value function with respect to wi is ω3 = ω4 = ω5 = 0. This linearity of
the value function with respect to waiting times is not surprising given the linear structure of the





implying that supply is constant, and thus independent of waiting times, in each t.







































Since the last two terms depend only on ω1 and ω2, we focus on the 2× 2 system and solve for ω1.
The solution is given by
ω1 = −
τα1 [2ρτ + θ(2− β)N ]




Inserting the expression for ω1 into the optimal supply rule for hospitals i and j yields Si = Sj =
SCL as given by (13) in Section 4. Using this result, the closed-loop steady-state waiting time is
derived from the equations of motion (11)-(12), with ẇi(t) = ẇj(t) = 0. Simple algebra shows that
wi = wj = w
CL as given by (16) in Section 4.














Furthermore, in order to have a partially covered monopolistic segment in the steady-state, the
following condition must be satisfied:
0 <













whereas the upper bound is satisfied if p < γN2 −
2θτα1
φ , which always holds if p < p. Thus,
an interior-solution equilibrium (i.e., positive waiting times with a partially covered monopolistic
segment) requires p ∈ P = (max{0, p}, p). Since p > p for β ∈ (0, 1), P is non-empty if p > 0,
which requires that γ is sufficiently large.
A.2 Increasing marginal disutility of waiting time
When α2 > 0, the solution to (A.6)-(A.8) depends on the root of a sixth degree polynomial,
precluding the computation of an analytical solution. Assume, for now, that a solution exists and
that it is such that (21) in Proposition 4 constitutes a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium.

































A solution to Hospital i’s maximisation problem is attained if the value function is concave with
respect to wi, which requires ω3 < 0. The greater root (unambiguously positive) is therefore ruled
out. For the smaller root to be negative, the second term under the square-root must be positive,




























 > 0. (A.17)
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Additionally, in order for (21) to be a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium, the value function
must be bounded from above. A necessary and sufficient condition for this requirement to hold is
that waiting times converge in equilibrium. Inserting (7), (8), (21), and the analogous supply rule









































































The Jacobian of (A.18)-(A.19) is
JCL = θ































A sufficient condition for waiting times to converge is that both eigenvalues are negative. Then,
s1 < 0 if ω5 > −γNθτ + ω3 and s2 < 0 if ω5 <
γ(1−β)N
θτ − ω3.
Using the expression for ω3 as a function of ω5, (A.15), the necessary condition s1 < 0 ∧ s2 <
























































Thus, provided that a solution to (A.6)-(A.8) exists, it constitutes a Markov Perfect Nash Equi-
librium (or closed-loop equilibrium) if ω5 ∈ Ω. Finally, an equilibrium with ω5 = 0 is ruled out by
inspection of (A.6)-(A.8).
The eigenvalues given by (A.21)-(A.22) also provide confirmation that the supply rules derived
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in the previous subsection, under constant marginal disutility of waiting time, constitute a Markov
Perfect Nash Equilibrium. It is straightforward to see from (A.21) and (A.22) that s1 < 0 and
s2 < 0 when ω3 = ω5 = 0.
A.2.1 Transitional dynamics
In order to analyse the convergence to the steady-state in the closed-loop solution, we turn to its
open-loop representation. That is, we derive time-profiles of the waiting time, supply, and demand
from the optimal closed-loop supply rule. Let the superscript CL denote the closed-loop steady-
state. The eigenvalues governing the system of differential equations (A.18)-(A.19), s1 and s2, are
respectively associated with the eigenvectors ν1 = c1 [ 1 −1 ]
T and ν2 = c2 [ 1 1 ]
T , with c1, c2 ∈ R.




s2t + wCL, (A.25)
wj(t) = −C1es1t + C2es2t + wCL, (A.26)
where C1 and C2 are arbitrary constants. The closed-loop steady-state waiting time w
CL is retrieved


















γ (ω3 + ω5)
. (A.27)
Inserting the initial conditions wi(0) = w0i and wj(0) = w0j into (A.25)-(A.26) and solving for C1
and C2 gives C1 =
w0i−w0j
2 and C2 =
w0i+w0j
2 − w
CL. Then, waiting times at Hospital i converge












es2t + wCL. (A.28)
Consider, now, the dynamics of supply and demand. Inserting (A.28) and the analogous equation























Using (7), (A.28), and the analogous equation for wj(t), the dynamics of demand faced by Hospital































If w0i = w0j , it follows from equations (A.28)-(A.31) that the dynamics of waiting times, supply,
and demand are uniquely governed by s2, and convergence is thus monotonic. By the same token, if
the initial waiting times differ but their average equals the steady-state waiting time wCL, dynamics
are uniquely governed by s1, and convergence is monotonic as well in this case. Note, additionally,
that demand in the competitive segment always converges monotonically to βN/2.
For the transitional dynamics in the closed-loop solution under constant marginal disutility of
waiting time, simply set ω3 = ω5 = 0 in equations (A.28)-(A.31). Constant hospital activity over
time for α2 = 0 is then confirmed by (A.29).
A.2.2 Non-monotonic convergence
Equations (A.28)-(A.31) show that convergence to the steady-state depends on two, possible oppos-
ing, forces. It depends on whether a hospital’s initial waiting time is longer than that of the rival,
and whether the average initial waiting time in the market differs from the steady-state waiting
time. When these two conditions hold, the possibility of non-monotonic convergence arises. To see
why non-monotonic convergence might occur, consider the equilibrium dynamics of waiting times
described in (A.28). If the average initial waiting time is above (below) the steady-state, the first
two terms have opposite signs for the hospital with the shorter (longer) waiting time. In both
cases, whether or not non-monotonic convergence emerges depends on the relative size and speed
of convergence (to zero) of each of those terms.

















where s1 and s2 are given by (A.21) and (A.22), respectively. Convergence is non-monotonic for
Hospital i if and only if t∗ ∈ R+. With s1, s2 < 0, the first factor in (A.32) is negative if |s1| > |s2|.
Thus, t∗ ∈ R+ if and only if the second factor in (A.32) is defined and is negative, which requires
that the expression in the square brackets lies between 0 and 1. It is possible to derive some
easily interpretable conditions for this expression to be positive. Since − s2s1 < 0, we must have
w0i+w0j−2wCL
w0i−w0j < 0. Two cases then arise:
1. If the average initial waiting time is above the steady-state waiting time, the numerator is
positive, and
w0i+w0j−2wCL
w0i−w0j is negative only if Hospital i has an initial waiting time below
that of Hospital j.
2. If the average initial waiting time is below the steady-state waiting time, the numerator is
negative, and
w0i+w0j−2wCL
w0i−w0j is negative only if Hospital i has an initial waiting time above
that of Hospital j.
Therefore, when the average initial waiting time is above (below) the steady-state waiting time,
it is the hospital with the shortest (longest) waiting time that exhibits non-monotonic convergence,






To conclude the proof, we consider the shape of (A.28). Evaluating its second-order derivative
with respect to t at t∗ yields the following results:
1. If (w0i + w0j > 2w
CL) ∧ (w0i < w0j), then w
′′
i (t







(w0i − w0j) < −(w0i + w0j − 2wCL). (A.33)
Diving both sides by (w0i−w0j) reverses the inequality sign. Then, using (A.32), the inequality
becomes s1s2 > 1, which is true.
2. If (w0i + w0j < 2w
CL) ∧ (w0i > w0j), then w
′′
i (t







(w0i − w0j) > −(w0i + w0j − 2wCL). (A.34)
Diving both sides by (w0i − w0j) does not reverse the inequality sign. Then, using (A.32),
the inequality becomes s1s2 > 1, which is true.
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∈ (0, 1), and the average initial waiting time is above
(below) the steady-state waiting time, the dynamics of the waiting time at the hospital with the
shortest (longest) initial wait has a unique maximum (minimum). This implies that the waiting time
at the hospital with the shortest (longest) initial wait first increases (decreases) before decreasing
(increasing) towards the steady-state.
Appendix B: The open-loop solution
Let µi(t) and λi(t) denote, respectively, the costate variables associated with the dynamic equations
of wi(t) and wj(t), given by (11) and (12), respectively, for Hospital i. That is, µi(t) is associated
with Hospital i’s waiting time and λi(t) with that of the rival. The current-value Hamiltonian is









+ µi(t)θ[Di(wi(t), wj(t))− Si(t)] + λi(t)θ[Dj(wi(t), wj(t))− Sj(t)]. (B.1)
Candidates for optimal supply path Si(t) and costate trajectories µi(t) and λi(t) must satisfy
∂Hi/∂Si(t) = 0, µ̇i(t) = ρµi(t)− ∂Hi/∂wi(t), and λ̇i(t) = ρλi(t)− ∂Hi/∂wj(t). More extensively:






















The solution must also satisfy the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
e−ρtµi(t)wi(t) = 0 and lim
t→∞
e−ρtλi(t)wj(t) = 0. (B.5)
Optimality is established by concavity of the current-value Hamiltonian with respect to Si(t) and
wi(t). Inserting the definition of demand (7) and the optimality condition for supply (B.2) into the
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Let the superscript OL denote the symmetric open-loop steady-state in which wi(t) = wj(t) =
wOL, µi(t) = µj(t) = µ
OL, and Si(t) = Sj(t) = S
OL. Setting ẇ(t) = µ̇(t) = λ̇(t) = 0 in equations
(B.3), (B.4), and (B.5) and solving for the steady-state waiting time and costate variable gives
wOL =
γφτ


































It can be shown (calculations available upon request) that this equilibrium is stable in the saddle
sense, and that the steady-state is characterised by non-negative waiting times and a partially
covered monopolistic segment if the cost parameter γ is sufficiently large.














= Nθ2(α1 + α2w
OL)
(1− β)[Nθ(2− β) + 4τρ]θN + (2− β)(τρ)2
2γ(Nθ + τρ)2[N(1− β)θ + τρ]2
> 0 (B.10)
is the marginal effect of τ on steady-state supply for a given waiting time. Thus, regardless of
whether the marginal provider disutility of waiting time is constant or increasing, more patient
choice leads to higher steady-state waiting times.
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B.1 Non-linear patient disutility of waiting
Suppose that hospital demand is given by (30) in Section 6.1. Defining the Hamiltonian as before,
the optimality conditions in the symmetric steady-state are now given by









λOL + α1 + α2w









µOL = 0. (B.13)
Using (30) and (B.12)-(B.13) to solve for µOL and λOL, we obtain
µOL = −τ
2
2ρτ + θ(2− β)N ∂f(w
OL)
∂w[




ρτ + θN ∂f(w
OL)
∂w











µOL < 0. (B.15)















Existence requires that the second-order conditions of the hospitals’ maximisation problem
are satisfied. These are given by ∂2Hi/∂S
2
i ≤ 0, ∂2Hi/∂w2i ≤ 0, and (∂2Hi/∂S2i )(∂2Hi/∂w2i ) −
















Evaluated at the steady-state, this expression becomes
−α2 +
[



























0, the second-order conditions are satisfied if α2 > 0 and the degree of convexity of f is sufficiently
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ρτ + θN ∂f(w
OL)
∂w






























ρτ + θN ∂f(w
OL)
∂w
]2 ≤ 0, (B.22)
and
Γ(wOL) = (ρτ)2(2− β) + 4ρτθ(1− β)N ∂f(w
OL)
∂w






To show that (B.22) is always non-positive in the steady-state equilibrium, notice that the right-













/∂w2 in equation (B.22)



























This implies that ∂µOL/∂wOL ≤ 0, and thus ∂wOL/∂τ < 0, for every specification of f (w) that is
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compatible with equilibrium existence under open-loop rules.
B.2 Non-linear patient disutility of travelling
Suppose the patient utility function is redefined as indicated in Section 6.2. The optimality condi-



















































ρτ + θβN +
g′( 12)θ(1−β)N
g′(xOLM )









ρτ + θβN +
2g′( 12)θ(1−β)N
g′(xOLM )
µOL < 0. (B.28)











Existence requires that the second-order conditions of the hospitals’ maximisation problem
are satisfied. These are given by ∂2Hi/∂S
2
i ≤ 0, ∂2Hi/∂w2i ≤ 0, and (∂2Hi/∂S2i )(∂2Hi/∂w2i ) −














µi ≤ 0. (B.30)


























second-order conditions are satisfied if α2 > 0 and the degree of convexity of g is sufficiently small.
















































































































































































































































ρτ + θβN +
g′( 12)θ(1−β)N
g′(xOLM )





≤ 0, the expressions on the right-hand side of (B.35) and (B.38) are unambiguously





a negative sign of ∂µOL/∂τ and ∂µOL/∂wOL, which implies ∂wOL/∂τ < 0, requires that g′′
(
xOLM
)
is sufficiently low.
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